Yaren Duvarci
Central European University
Contemporary discussions on free will witness a surge in advocating for naturalistic libertarianism, particularly through the lens of an event-causal framework. This paper explores the compatibility of such perspectives with a broadly physicalist worldview, wherein mental states are construed as either identical to or reducible to brain states. Focusing on two primary objections—namely, the luck objection and the disappearing agent objection—I argue that any robust libertarian theory must offer a compelling response to these challenges since (i) if the outcome of an action is just a matter of luck, that action cannot be free and (ii) the absence of a free agent precludes the existence of free will decisions.
The luck objection questions the freedom of actions by attributing outcomes solely to chance, while the disappearing agent objection emphasizes the indispensable role of the agent in free will decisions.Through an examination of these objections, I contend that event-causal theories face limitations in providing satisfactory solutions, particularly in terms of accounting for control. Moreover, I discuss how these theories overlook the pivotal role of the agent in the exercise of free action. In response, I propose a reconsideration of agent-causation as a viable alternative to event-causal frameworks, as it offers a solution to both objections. However, I conclude by noting that while agent-causation presents promising insights into addressing these objections, its compatibility with physicalism remains a point of contention.
Chair: Aleksandar Draskovic
Time: September 13th, 15:20-15:50
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 