“Logic is empirical” – Reflections on Wittgenstein’s early understanding of logic

Moritz Rene Pretzsch

University of Kassel

This contribution address the problem of how the early Wittgenstein, in confrontation with B. Russel’s type theory and Platonic realism and G. W. Frege’s understanding of logic, can on the one hand argue for an experiential independence of logic and on the other hand himself remark during a meeting of the Vienna Circle, to M. Schlick and F. Waismann, “logic is empirical”. Just as he seemingly asserts this in the complex sentence 5.552 of the Tractatus, which is often underrepresented in research. It is first argued that a distinction must be made between two kinds of experience and consequently between two different meanings of “empirical”. It goes on to point out that logic – as understood by the early Wittgenstein – does depend on an experience, albeit not an experience in the proper sense. It is ultimately argued that this experience of a particular kind is nonsensical, that it has metaphysical potential – can even be placed in a philosophical tradition – and can also be associated, albeit with some reservation, with the Wittgensteinian mystical.

Chair: Ragna Oeynhausen

Time: September 13th, 14:40-15:10

Location: SR 1.004, online