Luis F. Bartolo Alegre
LMU Munich
According to various perspectives, logic is deemed topic-neutral; that is, it serves as a theory of inference applicable uniformly across diverse topics, contexts, or domains. In essence, the rules of inference established by a logical theory should exhibit indifference to the specific subject matter for which inferences are intended. The concept of topic-neutrality is central to contemporary characterisations of logic, often intertwined with the formality (Dutilh Novaes, 2011) and with the universality commonly attributed to logic (Woleński, 2017).
Moreover, there is a common assumption that monistic positions inherently embrace logic neutrality, while pluralistic positions reject it (see Bueno & Vivanco, 2019). However, we aim to demonstrate that the relationships between logic-neutrality and both monism and pluralism are significantly more intricate. This presentation will propose a conceptual framework designed to facilitate a nuanced differentiation among monistic and pluralistic positions in logic, elucidating their potential connections with topic-neutrality.
Furthermore, our framework will enable us to explore the interplay between the notion of topic-neutrality and other crucial concepts in both classical and non-classical logics, including alethicality, relevance, and structurality. These explorations will show that the concept of topic-neutrality is not sufficiently clear as it stands in the current literature. We will show, for instance, a sense in which relevance logics cannot be truly topic-neutral, contrary to what some authors may argue (cf. Beall & Restall, 2006).
Bibliography
J.C. Beall & G. Restall, Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2006.
O. Bueno & M. Vivanco, “La lógica y sus aplicaciones: ¿platonismo o noplatonismo?”, Andamios, 16.41 (2019), pp. 19-41. DOI: 10.29092/uacm.v16i41.713
C. Dutilh Novaes, “The Different Ways in which Logic is said to be Formal”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 32.4 (2011), pp. 303-332. DOI: 10.1080/01445340.2011.555505
J. Woleński, “Universality of Logic”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 46 (2017), pp. 21–32. DOI: 10.18778/0138-0680.46.1.2.03
Chair: Michael Stöger
Time: September 13th, 14:40-15:10
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 