B.V.E. Hyde
University of Leeds | Durham University
This study advances a new methodological ideal for science. It starts with a characterization of the ideal of scientific objectivity as cluster concept (ballungen) with many meanings under it (1), all sharing the commonality of safeguarding against epistemic threats (2) where the meaning of the term therefore varies over time (3) and by context (4) because of the variance in epistemic threats. The rest of this study conceptually reengineers scientific objectivity for value-laden science.
Values are epistemically threatening because they can turn scientific research into ‘an intellectual game in which you defend what you want to believe’ (5-6) insofar as ‘you can prove almost anything you want by cherry-picking’ (7). Social values should not be allowed to bias research towards a predetermined conclusion (8), and the traditional way of ensuring this was to get rid of values outright (9) by requiring impartiality, neutrality and autonomy (10).
This attitude was criticized (11-14) and it is now mostly consensus that science cannot be value-free (15). There is also a better reason for rejecting the value-free ideal: values are also epistemically beneficial because they can make researchers more objective. For one, the same values that might cause one to commit fraud or misconduct might push researchers in the other direction because they want to get the right answers (16-17; e.g. 18). Secondly, values might alert scientists to problems in the real world (19), which might explain the shift away from androcentric primatology (e.g. 20-22) when more women entered the field (e.g. 23). Finally, insofar as values have some connexion to one’s epistemic standpoint, the incorporation of values into research might produce ‘strong objectivity’ (24).
This suggests a value-laden ideal of objectivity. It is argued that value-pluralism and value-maximalism are conducive towards stronger objectivity. A war of all against all of values will provide researchers with a great multiplicity of standpoints but will not cause a proliferation in epistemic risk on the grounds that the broadened collective perspective of the research programme is not at risk of becoming myopic again. Thus, let a hundred values bloom in science. The notion of scientific objectivity conceptually reengineered for value-laden science emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity in contemporary research
Before concluding, this study addresses an argument advanced by Jacob Stegenga and Tarun Menon in an unpublished study of theirs in which they propound what they called ‘Sisyphean Science’. They think that, even if science cannot be value-free, scientists ought to aim for value-freedom as a methodological principle. The problems with their view are that they fail to acknowledge the methodological value of values (25); they do not fully appreciate that science needs to be transparent (26-27) and that Sisyphean Science might only disguise those values, not minimize their malign impact (28-29); and that minimizing values does not minimize the epistemic threat they cause because the size, systematicity or numeracy of values do not correspond to how epistemically threatening they are (which is demonstrated through the example of State Shintō ideology on twentieth century Japanese archaeology).
References
(1) Cartwright N et al. (2022). The Tangle of Science. Oxford University Press.
(2) Koskinen I (2020) BJPS 71(4): 1187-1207.
(3) Daston L & Galison P (2007) Objectivity. Zone Books.
(4) Montuschi, E (2004) Social Epistemology 18(2-3): 109-122.
(5) Gaus G (2005) Think 3(9): 63-68.
(6) Frazer ML (2023) Perspectives on Politics 21(4): 1258-1269.
(7) Hansson SO (2017) SHPS 63(A): 39-47.
(8) Anderson E (2004) Hypatia 19(1): 1-24.
(9) Reiss J & Sprenger J (2020) SEP, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/
(10) Lacey H (1999) Is Science Value-Free? Routledge.
(11) Churchman CW (1948) Theory of Experimental Inference. Macmillan.
(12) Rudner R (1953) Philosophy of Science 20(1) 1-6.
(13) Braithwaite RB (1953) Scientific Explanation. Cambridge University Press.
(14) Hempel CG (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation. The Free Press.
(15) Kincaid H et al. (2007) Value-Free Science. Oxford University Press.
(16) Loperena CA (2016) Current Anthropology 57(3): 332-346.
(17) Hale CR (2001) SSRC 2(1-2): 13-15.
(18) Geffen N (2010) Debunking Delusions. Jacana.
(19) Hauswald R (2021) Synthese 198: 597-614.
(20) Ardrey R (1966) The Territorial Imperative. Atheneum.
(21) Morris D (1967) The Naked Ape. Jonathan Cape.
(22) Tiger L (1969) Men in Groups. Nelson.
(23) Hrdy SB (1981) The Woman That Never Evolved. Harvard University Press.
(24) Harding S (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Cornell University Press.
(25) Pulkkinen K et al. (2022) Nature Climate Change 12: 4-6.
(26) Wilsdon J & Willis R (2004) See-Through Science. Demos.
(27) Intemann K & de Melo-Martín I (2018) The Fight Against Doubt. Oxford University Press.
(28) Drew L & Taylor N (2014) Counterpoints 448: 158-176.
(29) Elliott KC (2017) A Tapestry of Values. Oxford University Press.
Chair: tba
Time: tba
Location: tba
SOPhiA 2026 