Natalia Witosza
Jagiellonian University
There is no doubt that different issues connected to procreation (e.g. abortion and in vitro fertilization) seem to be widely considered and explored topics in public debates in different democratic states. However, surprisingly, this does not apply to the topic of surrogacy, which seems to be overlooked in the media discourse. At the same time the topic of surrogacy is thriving in the philosophical debate, as evidenced by the number of publications in recent years (e.g. Gheaus, Straehle, 2024; Magnusson, 2020; Devillers and Stoicea Deram, ed. 2021).
In this paper, I investigate the issue of surrogacy and argue that surrogacy should not be allowed. My thesis is that the rejection of surrogacy is supported by the argument from harm, and the argument from autonomy is unconvincing when considering the non-ideal circumstances of our world. I present how analytical philosophy, especially ethics and bioethics, can respond to the problems of the modern world.
In the first part of the paper, I provide the necessary framework to understand the subject. I introduce the types of surrogacy (e.g. altruistic and commercial). I also briefly outline the legal context of this practice.
In the second part, I analyse the most significant argument in favour of surrogacy, that is the autonomy argument. It states that people should be free to decide on their private matters, and a decision to become a surrogate belongs to this kind of matter. If a state forbids a woman to become a surrogate, it is a deprivation of her autonomy (Straehle, 2016).
In the third part, I consider argument from harm to women. It states that surrogacy interferes with the surrogate’s sense of self, thus violating her autonomy. Surrogacy also contributes to the already significant gender inequality in society (Satz, 2010).
In conclusion of the paper, I highlight how crucial it is to investigate the issue of surrogacy in the context of contemporary social challenges, such as market exploitation and gender inequality.
Bibliography:
• Devillers, Marie Josephe and Stoicea Deram, Ana-Luana ed. “Towards the Abolition of Surrogate Motherhood”. Melbourne, AUS: Spinifex Press, 2021.
• Gheaus, Anca and Straehle Christine. “Debating Surrogacy”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024.
• Magnusson, Erik. “Can Gestation Ground Parental Rights?” Social Theory and Practice 46 (2020): 111– 42.
• Satz, Debra. “Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
• Straehle, Christine. “Vulnerability, Autonomy and Self Respect.” In Straehle, Vulnerability, Autonomy and Applied Ethics. Routledge, 2016.
Chair: Dominik Boll
Time: September 11th, 17:40 – 18:10
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 