Frameworks of Freedom: Hayek, Critical Legal Studies, and the Battle for Legal Predictability

Ryan McLaughlin

Boston College

This paper employs the rigor and clarity characteristic of analytic philosophy to offer a Hayekian critique of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) indeterminacy thesis, analyzing its implications within key U.S. legal cases. By discussing landmark decisions such as Kelo v. City of New London 545 US 469 (2005) and Citizens United v. FEC 558 US 310 (2010), the paper proposes Friedrich Hayek’s rule of law as a superior framework for legal interpretation and application, contrasting sharply with the CLS view of law as a tool reinforcing social and economic inequalities. Utilizing precise logical analysis and rational argumentation, it demonstrates that while both approaches critique the power dynamics of legal outcomes, Hayek’s emphasis on legal predictability and the minimization of government interference provides a more consistent and justice-oriented approach. This critique not only underscores the theoretical and practical advantages of Hayek’s framework in the U.S. context but also argues for its broader global applicability, suggesting that Hayek’s principles of legal predictability can serve as a universal guide for enhancing justice in diverse legal systems worldwide. The conclusion calls for further research into the global application of Hayekian principles, proposing that analytic philosophy’s clear and methodical approach can facilitate a deeper understanding of legal frameworks internationally.

Chair: Armin Mašala

Time: September 13th, 12:00 – 12:30

Location: SR 1.006


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