Shohei Matsumoto
The University of Tokyo
This paper examines whether and how we can acquire testimonially warranted (justified) beliefs through indirect communication, such as conversational implicature and insinuation. One reason speakers may choose indirect communication is that it allows them to communicate something while retaining the ability to plausibly deny having meant that thing. This feature of deniability is especially relevant when considering the practice of insinuation. Elizabeth Fricker (2012; 2023) and Andrew Peet (2015) suggest that if a speaker can plausibly deny what she meant that P, the hearer cannot gain the warranted belief that P based on the speaker’s utterance. However, these views presuppose that a speaker’s taking responsibility for the truth of what she asserts is essential for a hearer’s warrant, which is controversial.
In this paper, I aim to offer an alternative account of warrant of beliefs gained through implicatures and insinuations. I adopt Peter Graham’s functionalist theory of warrant as it is a promising account of warrant and is also the theoretical basis for presumptivism (or so-called anti-reductionism) in the epistemology of testimony [See Graham (2010)]. According to this theory, beliefs are warranted just in case they are formed through a normally functioning cognitive mechanism that has a function of forming true beliefs reliably. Unlike the rival view above, the functionalist account does not assume that the speaker’s responsibility grounds the hearer’s warrant.
My purpose is to investigate factors that affect the reliability of belief formation from indirect communication in order to clarify when we can obtain such warranted beliefs. In particular, I expect the following points will be related: (1) cognitive processes employed by the hearer in comprehending what the speaker means, (2) the type of speech act the speaker performs, (3) the speaker’s honesty and competency, and (4) plausible deniability for the speaker or the determinacy of what the speaker meant for the hearer.
Fricker, E. (2012). “Stating and Insinuating”
Fricker, E. (2023). “Testimony, Luck, and Conversational Implicature”
Graham, P. J. (2010). “Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.”
Peet, A. (2015). “Testimony, Pragmatics, and Plausible Deniability”
Chair: Henrik Hörmann
Time: September 12th, 11:20 – 11:50
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 