Youssef Aguisoul
University of Lisbon
What grounds the numerical difference of indiscernibles like Black’s (1952) spheres, which stand two miles apart? Some philosophers say empty collections of facts ground it (e.g., Litland (2021)), some say facts of existence ground it (e.g., Rubenstein (2024)), and some say facts of qualitative difference ground it (e.g., Curtis (2014)).
I’m interested in the qualitative account, particularly in the Distance Account (DA), which states that Black’s spheres numerically differ in virtue of the fact that they stand some distance apart (e.g., Shiver (2014); Lee (2023)). More generally, DA grounds facts of numerical difference in facts of distance. However, DA faces the presupposition objection: facts of numerical difference are metaphysically prior to facts of distance, so the latter presuppose rather than ground the former.
To avoid the presupposition objection, I propose a novel interpretation of DA, which I call the ‘Compositional Distance Account’ (CDA). Unlike DA which grounds facts of numerical difference in facts of distance simpliciter, CDA grounds them in facts I term facts of compositional distance. These facts involve deeper distances holding, not between less fundamental entities like spheres, but between more fundamental entities like spheres’ proper parts.
CDA states that Black’s spheres numerically differ, not in virtue of the fact that they’re distant, but in virtue of the fact that the proper parts that compose them are distant. By stating so, it sidesteps the presupposition objection, since relations of compositional distance figure where proper parts figure, and proper parts are more fundamental than their wholes.
Chair: Annica Vieser
Time: September 11th, 14:10 – 14:40
Location: HS E.002 (online)
SOPhiA 2026 