Leon Isenmann
University of Potsdam

Within analytic metaphysics, a growing number of authors state that they are engaged in modeling the fundamental structure of reality. My paper has two objectives: (1) to examine in virtue of which theoretical presuppositions this notion of modeling arises, and (2) to explain two major conceptional problems regarding metaphysical model-building.
I will start by posing the question of why talk of metaphysical modeling arises in the first place. In this context, I will point out two aspects of the theoretical paradigm in which contemporary analytic metaphysics operates that may be helpful to understand this practice. One is contemporary metaphysic’s dominant mode of explanation: the mode of calculation, as Spiegel (2021) points out. The other is the basic function of the host of relations Bennet (2017) calls metaphysical building-relations, which I will argue function as mechanizing relations that fulfill the theoretical role necessitated by the explanatory mode of calculation.
Having done so, I’ll introduce the first problem with metaphysical model-building by examining how the term ‘model’ is employed. As I will argue, the concept of a model in analytic metaphysics is critically underdetermined. I’ll answer to this first, definitional problem by formulating a substantial minimal concept of what a metaphysical model must amount to considering the theoretical presuppositions and goals of the authors which employ the term. One element of my proposed minimal definition is that such models must produce a robust, comparable explanatory output. Formulating this concept then leads to the second problem. Because as I will argue, models in metaphysics don’t in fact produce such outputs. Instead, we find that their validity wholly depends on the philosophical convictions of their observer. I will conclude by arguing that the two problems jointly cast serious doubt over the viability of metaphysical modeling as a philosophical practice.

Chair: Annica Vieser
Time: September 11th, 13:30 – 14:00
Location: HS E.002
