James Alexander McDaniel
Paris-Lodron Universität Salzburg
Quantifier Variance, specifically as advanced by Jared Warren, is the claim that there may exist multiple logically identical quantifiers that still vary in meaning (Warren, 2020). This variance is supposed to deflate numerous metaphysical debates, since for many different positions there exists a possible quantifier and language to validate that metaphysical position. Previous attempts to show that logically identical quantifiers cannot vary in meaning ultimately fail (Hale & Wright, 2009; Dorr, 2014). This talk will present a novel objection to Inferentialist-aligned Quantifier Variance. The objection starts with Warren’s own requirements for identity of logical role and shows that the most straightforward reading is clearly inadequate. It is in fact easy to add new rules for a constant that, while not altering the old rules, massively increase the number of derivable sentences. Further attempts at precisifying the criteria for a logical constant’s role (along Inferentialist lines) similarly turn out to be inadequate for salvaging Quantifier Variance. The most plausible way is in terms of what I term Rule Conservativity, yet the relevant cases such as Hume’s Principle are radically non-conservative. Attempts to solve a related issue from the neo-Fregean camp do not successfully apply to this case (See: Hale & Wright 2000). The upshot of this discussion is that Quantifier Variance as seen through an Inferentialist lens turns out to be an implausible way of deflating existential claims, and should either be re-framed as Quantifier Logical Pluralism, or the thesis should be dropped entirely.
Chair: Michael Stöger
Time: September 13th, 10:40 – 11:10
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 