Xingyu Lyu
University of Mannheim
The aim of this presentation is to argue against color objectivism by appeal to science. Color objectivism is the view that colors are properties of physical objects. Roughly, the typical versions of color objectivism can be classified into two groups: reflectance-grounded objectivism (including reflectance physicalism, micro-structure physicalism, color primitivism) and color-disposition-grounded objectivism (including color dispositionalism, realizer and role functionalism). According to reflectance-grounded objectivism, colors are intrinsic, reflectance-related properties of physical objects. According to color-disposition-grounded objectivism, colors are properties that determine the materially realized dispositions to look colored to certain perceivers under certain conditions. Both groups of color theories are alleged to be well compatible with science. However, an examination of the physical theories of light reflection does not suggest so. Specifically, I will argue that, first, reflectance-grounded objectivism is false, since its metaphysics of reflectance is incompatible with the proper metaphysical interpretation of the reflectance concept suggested by electrodynamics, and, second, color-disposition-grounded objectivism is false, since its conceptual frame is incompatible with the mechanism of light reflection suggested by electrodynamics. As a result, if electrodynamics is true, then color objectivism is false.
Chair: Christabel Cane
Time: September 13th, 12:00 – 12:30
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 