Melina Bardt
Radboud University
Since neurodiversity is on everybody’s lips these days, more and more people have come to conceive of themselves as ‘being neurodivergent’. The neurodiversity paradigm contests presumed mental norms. It starts from the assumption that the minds and brains of people work in different ways. However, ‘being neurodivergent’ is not an attribute of received diagnoses. No doctor, brain scan, or other miscellaneous neurocognitive capability test are sufficient indicators to tell whether one is neurodivergent. That is because they lack one crucial part of information, namely how one assesses one’s capabilities by adopting a third-person stance to themselves.
Other than what the neuro-syllable suggests, I argue that ‘being neurodivergent’ does not track atypical neurocognitive mechanisms and circuits in the brain but is a folk psychological concept. In line with the mind-shaping approach to social cognition and interaction, I understand folk psychology as a regulative practice that shapes and regulates human interaction following shared folk psychological frameworks. Concepts of mental states are employed to regulate the behaviour and mind-related attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) of others and oneself. More precisely, I defend the following view: the primary use of ‘being neurodivergent’ is self-regulatory agency, and its secondary use is interactive-regulatory practice. It is a folk-psychological term that people use to make sense of their mental and behavioural experiences or propositional attitudes and make them conceivable to others. It just happens that many people who use it also happen to have received a diagnosis like Autism or ADHD. I do not question the existence of neurological or cognitive divergent types or styles. I claim that this is not what ‘being neurodivergent’ is about.
My argument is structured as follows: First, I offer a conceptual analysis of how the term ‘being neurodivergent’ is currently used amongst neurodiversity scholars and communities. I refer to writings and statements by advocates like Judy Singer, Kassiane Asasumasu, and Nick Walker, as well as philosophers of neurodiversity like Robert Chapman and Kristien Hens. Second, I synthesize my findings. I conclude that ‘being neurodivergent’ might not be so different from ‘being sad’ or ‘being angry’.
Chair: Mathilde Cappelli
Time: September 12th, 11:20 – 11:50
Location: SR.1006
SOPhiA 2026 