Dominik Bonhöfer
KU Leuven
Recently epistemology has been influenced by a disrupting and fascinating idea. What if, when forming a belief, we are ill advised to only pursue the truth? What else is there to pursue, the traditional epistemologist might ask? Defenders of this new idea would claim that believing is not just about believing the truth but also about believing what is right. After all, our beliefs have the potential to hurt feelings, violate dignity or simply wrong someone. Isn’t there an obligation to avoid such beliefs on moral grounds? This idea is called the theory of Doxastic Wronging. For Doxastic Wronging theorists, the “idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what [we] think or what we believe, is a natural one.” Subsequently, an account of morality is developed that allows for moral justification to range over beliefs. Just as I am permitted or even obligated to help someone in need, I am permitted to believe that all men are created equal. If my world were to become sinister and my mind turned hateful, I may become forbidden to believe some of the according beliefs. The salient wrongs of racism and sexism are often expressed more in belief than in action. There is no need for a discriminatory action to take place when the offender’s eyes already sparkle of hatred for my sexual orientation.
However, I will object to the existence of Doxastic Wronging. Our beliefs cannot wrong someone in any morally relevant sense. My objections are concerned with the possibility of Doxastic Wrongings, facing our limited capabilities of voluntarily forming our beliefs. Doxastic Wronging theorists usually embrace two theories. The first theory is Doxastic Voluntarism, which is the claim that we can take up propositional attitudes at will. Given the principle ‘ought implies can’ nothing is in the way of a theory of Doxastic Wronging, as the ‘can’ is provided. Doxastic Voluntarism will be the first theory that I object to. I will defend the most influential theory of Doxastic Involunarism, formulated by William Alston, against a recent attack by Matthias Steup. The second theory interesting to Doxastic Wronging theorists is a theory of a deontologically structured epistemology. This is the claim that whether we are justified in believing something is determined by rules. Only if rules determine what we shall believe, there can there be moral rules that guide our belief formation process. Doxastic Wronging, then, would be a violation of those moral rules. But this can only be so if there are rules in the first place. Thus, my second major argument is an objection to theories of a deontologically structured epistemology. More specifically, I will object to Pamela Hieronymi’s approach of reconciling Doxastic Invountarism with a deontologically structured epistemology. If she was to succeed, we would be responsible for our beliefs, even if they were formed involuntarily. Thus, the way of Doxastic Wronging theorists would be cleared and they would not even have to rely on the truth of Doxasic Voluntarism.
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SOPhiA 2026 