Bin Zhao
University of California, Irvine
Nozick has an account of inferential knowledge which has rarely been discussed. According to this account, in order to know q via inference from p, S’s belief in q should track the truth of p in the right way. In detail,
S knows (via inference from p) that q iff
1*. S knows that p.
2*. q is true, and S infers q from p.
3*. If q were false, S wouldn’t believe that p.
4*. If q were true, S would believe that p.
In this paper, it is argued that the account is problematic. It is both too restrictive and too inclusive. It is too restrictive because condition 4* is not satisfied in some cases of inferential knowledge. It is too inclusive because condition 3*, together with other conditions, could be easily satisfied in some cases where inferential knowledge does not exist.
Chair: Natalia Tomash
Time: September 8th, 15:20-15:50
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 