Cristina Somcutean
University of Bayreuth
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is a biologically informed approach to studying human behavior. EP theorizes that contemporary women and men differ psychologically, particularly in mating and sexuality, and has been criticized by feminist science scholars for being androcentric and essentialist. However, EPs argue that their research on gender-specific psychological differences is compatible with feminist perspectives. This paper aims to evaluate if integrating EP scholarship on gender differences into feminist scholarship is possible by investigating EP’s core scientific commitments. I will argue that EP’s theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings that pertain to the study of gender cannot be integrated into feminist thought because they do not align with its core values. To argue for this thesis, I will use Longino’s (1996) feminist theoretical virtues as dimensions for categorizing, assessing, and supplementing feminist critiques of EP’s perspective on gender. I reframe feminist theoretical virtues as tools for revealing how certain theories, models, and hypotheses rely upon, promote contentious norms, and suppress gender. Since most EP theories of gender-specific psychological differences are based on a set of foundations, selected examples will be discussed to evaluate core methodological and ontological commitments and thus aid in making more generalized judgments about EP. In conclusion, from a feminist viewpoint, I argue that EP theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings are often empirically inadequate, mainstream and androcentric, and ontologically too homogeneous. Further, EP employs single-factor control models, has no straightforward practical application, and might even be politically dangerous. Thus, based on the fundamental makeup of EP and feminism, successful integration is not as easy as some EPs claim.
Chair: Johannes Nyström
Time: September 8th, 15:20-15:50
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 