Bare Particulars and External Exemplification

Youssef Aguisoul

University of Lisbon

Bare particularists distinguish Internal from External Exemplification. If particular P internally exemplifies universal F, P characterizes F. But if P externally exemplifies F, P is related to but doesn’t characterize F. Anti-bare particularists reject the distinction by rejecting external exemplification (EE). They argue that since the hallmark of exemplification is characterization and since EE isn’t hallmarked by characterization, EE isn’t a species of exemplification. In return, bare particularists offer two reasons for why EE is a species of exemplification: (1) EE plays a necessary role in the characterization of objects; (2) whenever EE occurs characterization occurs. Against (1), I argue that it’s one thing to say that EE plays a necessary role in object-characterization, it’s another to say that EE is a species of exemplification. Water plays a necessary role in the subsistence of living beings but isn’t itself a living being. Against (2), I advance  this  counterexample: the bare particular of the presently dead Socrates externally exemplifies the universal ‘deadness’, yet Socrates himself, whose bones are fully decomposed by now, fails to internally exemplify or characterize deadness.

Chair: Elena Garadja

Time: September 6th, 16:00-16:30

Location: HS E.002


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