Sabina Domínguez Parrado
ILLC, University of Amsterdam
Some authors argue that truth is a normative concept, for it sets the normative standards for assertion or belief (see e.g. Boghossian 2003; Engel 2013; Lynch 2009; Ferrari 2009; McHugh 2014; Price 1998 ; Wedgwood 2002). Opponents of deflationism argue that if truth is normative, then deflationism cannot accommodate this substantial aspect of the concept of truth (Dummett 1959; Ferrari 2014; Price 1998; Wright 1992). This is the so called objection from normativity against deflationism. The present talk offers a new characterisation of truth as non-normative, and hence concludes that deflationism escapes this objection.
My talk will proceed as follows. I will first introduce deflationism about truth and outline the objection from normativity against it. Next, I present Russell (2020)’s framework which distinguishes three different ways in which any theory can be normative. I then move on to argue that the most prominent norms of assertion (and belief) do not appeal to truth. Building on Russell’s framework presented earlier, I argue that truth is normative only in the following weakest sense: truth isn’t normative by itself, but it has normative consequences when conjoined with additional truth-free normative principles. Hence, the objection from normativity does not apply against deflationism. I conclude by discussing the broader consequences of my argument for two related debates: the prospects for alethic pluralism, and the plausibility of genealogical approaches to normativity.
Chair: Szymon Sapalski
Time: September 6th, 17:30-18:00
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 