Angelica Mezzadri
University of Turin
Paradoxes and thought experiments have more in common than we would have thought. This paper argues that they do not form mutually exclusive categories. Rather, there is a natural and relevant subcategory of thought experiments that is also a natural subcategory of paradoxes. This subset is formed by alethic refuters, which are negative thought experiments that aim to disprove a target theory. Alethic refuters share typical features of paradoxes: they uncover inconsistencies and are used to criticize theories. They also play a relevant heuristic role by leading to theory revision and new theory construction. They serve as arguments in two ways: first, they are used to demonstrate logical connections between propositions. Second, they are part of a bigger argument concerning the resolution of the inconsistency. Moreover, there is a judgment element to them. The scenario they describe leads to a plausible conclusion, and the process of solving the inconsistency is partially guided by the plausibility of the argument components. In turn, some paradoxes share key features that identify thought experiments: in particular, some of them come with a scenario description that mirrors those of thought experiments. These scenarios are described colloquially and informally, even if a formalization of the paradox is available. Moreover, they describe hypothetical scenarios, rather than actual ones. This paper relies both on the relevant literature and the method of case analysis to prove these points. The paper’s findings have interesting metaphilosophical implications, including advancing our understanding of the functioning of paradoxes and thought experiments and providing a solution to the epistemological challenges that thought experiments face. In particular, we can draw from paradoxes to solve the problem of informativeness, the definition problem, and the reliability problem that alethic refuters face. Finally, some of the challenges that thought experiments face because of their reliance on a hypothetical scenario also apply to paradoxes. In particular, we focus on the problem of deviant realizations and its consequences for paradoxes.
Chair: tba
Time: September 7th, 11:20-11:50
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 