Ewa Grzeszczak
Jagiellonian University
In the debate about categorizing mental disorders, philosophers have often appealed to the causalism-descriptivism dichotomy (Zachar & Kendler 2007, Tsou 2015, Tsou 2016). However, only a few authors have explicitly considered the semantic question which follows the ontological one – what do the psychiatric diagnoses refer to (Radden 2003, Maung 2016)? As for now, we are still far from a definite answer. In my presentation I will discuss a certain problematic assumption which makes choosing the theory of reference for psychopathological terms a difficult task. Additionally, I will outline two possible routes that this debate can take once this assumption is challenged.
The descriptive and causal theories of reference come to mind as possible answers to the question of which semantics is appropriate for psychopathological terms. However, both have significant undesired consequences. The descriptive approach makes over-time and cross-cultural comparisons impossible and challenges the role of scientific discovery in defining mental disorders (Radden 2003), while the causal approach allows for asymptomatic cases of psychiatric disorders, which is highly counterintuitive (Maung 2016). Accepting asymptomatic cases may also prompt accusations of changing the topic – weren’t the symptoms of mental disorders what we wanted to understand and take care of in the first place?
I argue that choosing the right theory of reference for psychiatric terms is challenging only given an assumption that the concept of mental illness should be divided into surface and beneath-the-surface levels, with symptoms belonging to the former. However, there are various metaphysical accounts suggesting just the opposite (Kendler, Zachar & Craver 2011, Borsboom & Cramer 2013, Fried 2015, Borsboom et al. 2019). I believe that answering the question of whether symptoms can be included into essences of mental disorders is crucial to moving the semantic debate forward. If the answer is positive then natural kind semantics can be applied to psychiatric diagnoses. Otherwise we should focus on the consequences of applying some sort of descriptive theory of reference to psychiatric disorders.
Chair: Aaron Wirt
Time: September 7th, 11:20-11:50
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 