Catherine Hochman
UCLA
Philosophical inquiry into self-knowledge, self-consciousness, and agency seems to require an investigation of our mental states, specifically, those in which we represent ourselves. Perception provides fertile ground for this investigation. The tight connection between perception and one’s self, between what is perceived and who is perceiving, prompts the question of whether and how the self is accounted for in perceptual representation. A common philosophical view, which I call Implicitness, holds that the self remains implicit in perceptual representation (Campbell, 1994; Ismael, 2012; Musholt, 2015; Recanati, 2007, 2012). The basic idea is intuitive. What I perceptually represent are the objects of perception, things such as colors, textures, and shapes. I usually am not among the objects I perceive and so, my self is not perceptually represented. Nonetheless, what I perceive depends on where I am and so, I seem to play some implicit role in my perceptual representations.
In this paper, I argue that we should reject Implicitness because it admits of counterexamples. More specifically, I marshal empirical evidence to analyze two kinds of perceptual experiences – gaze shifts and vection – and reveal that both involve the use of a representation of self.
I then propose the Nested Frames View as a new account of when and how perceptual representations of self are used. I begin by arguing that the egocentric reference frames used in perception exhibit a nested structure. An egocentric reference frame is a framework for specifying spatial relations relative to oneself. I demonstrate that information about the self that is implicit in one layer of the nested structure is represented in the next. In this way, the nested structure accounts for the use of perceptual representations of self. I end by revealing how these representations of self form a hierarchy which tracks degrees of agency.
Chair: Sharon Casu
Time: September 6th, 17:30-18:00
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 