Damiano Ranzenigo
University of Konstanz
I aim at presenting some puzzles about the concept of ‘existential self-identification’ (ESI, from now on), according to which some people come to consider some of their strong and intrinsic evaluative states as constitutive of how they conceive of their lives as meaningful. Examples of existentially self-identifying people are found among some fervent religious believers and political activists, who cannot conceive of a meaningful life outside of their respective ideologies; queer-identifying people, who think that loving themselves as members of the LGBT+ community is necessary for their lives to be fulfilling; ‘Incels’, ‘furries’, and other members of online communities, who adopt a specific self-understanding they deem as the only viable one to find purpose in life; people deeply passionate about their professions, who are convinced they would be lost without their working routines; lovers and friends, who cannot fathom a purposeful existence without their close ones; etc.
ESI implies a sincere and conscious belief that one’s life’s meaningfulness entirely depends on a particular evaluative state. That belief might however be wrong: for instance, one might realize that one’s life goes on reasonably well after frustration of the evaluative state ESI is about. Nonetheless, I contend that existentially self-identifying agents cannot be wrong about at least two things: (1) that they strongly and intrinsically value the thing they existentially self-identify with; and (2) that they cannot fathom living a meaningful life without that thing. People can be wrong about valuing things they do not care much about but, as soon as they believe that an evaluative state is constitutive of their life’s meaningfulness, they will display dispositions as to avoid its frustration at all costs. Thus, they cannot be wrong about strongly and intrinsically valuing what their ESI is about, as for (1). On the other hand, despite the risk of being wrong about the constitutive relation between what one values and one’s life’s meaningfulness cannot be ruled out entirely, ESI still implies the constitution of the conception of one’s life as meaningful, as for (2). I will conclude by resisting the worry that people might too often be wrong about the constitutive relation between the evaluative state ESI is about and their life’s meaningfulness.
Chair: Sharon Casu
Time: September 6th, 16:00-16:30
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 