Morgan Adou
Aix-Marseille Université
The following paper aims at formulating and investigating a philosophical problem for sociology of scientific knowledge. This problem questions the status of “non-social causes” in Bloor’s strong program (Bloor, 1976). Following Latour remarks in his controversy with Bloor, I shall try to reconstruct his objections in the form of a more logical problem for sociology of scientific knowledge. I will then, conclude that this specific problem illustrates the need for a philosophical critique of sociology of scientific knowledge.
Bloor stated in his strong program that some non-social causes are in interaction with social causes in the formation of beliefs, whether they are true or false, rational, or irrational. If such a statement clearly preserves the strong program from any idealistic interpretation, it is unclear how these non-social have any effect on the formation of beliefs. Latour made a similar objection (Latour, 1999) when he questioned the role of these causes regarding the fact that SSK practitioners endorse the underdetermination of theories by experience.
After a brief reconstruction of this controversy, I will try to formulate this issue in the form of an incompatibility. It is possible that SSK can’t accept at the same time the principle of symmetry and the reality of non-social causes. This would be true if we consider that symmetry implies that non-social causes and social causes have the same logical status while underdetermination states the opposite. This will lead me to conclude that SSK, to be consistent, needs to redefine what it intends by non-social or revise its understating of underdetermination.
This shift from an objection to a logical problem, will lead me to conclude that SSK, far from being false or useless, needs a philosophical critique to give it the best interpretation possible.
References (selected)
BLOOR, David (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. University of Chicago Press.
FRIEDMAN, Michael (1998). On the sociology of scientific knowledge and its philosophical agenda. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (2):239-271.
LATOUR, Bruno (1999). For David Bloor…and beyond: a reply to David Bloor’s Anti-Latour. Studies in history and philosophy of science, 30(1), 113–129
Chair: Sebastián Sánchez Martínez
Time: September 6th, 16:00-16:30
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 