Should dualists accept mental causation?

Jan Rostek

Jagiellonian University

I argue that recent arguments designed to give more credibility to dualism with mental causation at the expense of epiphenomenalism are invalid and that the former, which can be dubbed causal dualism, should not be treated as a default option for dualists.
Metaphysicians with dualist tendencies might end up as epiphenomenalists or causal dualists. Causal dualism is widely considered to be the more attractive option of the two, even though none of the popular arguments for dualism rest on the appeal to the causal powers of the mental. Moreover, some of these arguments prompt their respective authors to accept epiphenomenalism (Jackson 1982, Chalmers 1996, see also Kim 2005). However, Bradford Saad has recently produced two arguments which, if sound, tip the balance in favor of causal dualism.
The first one (2018) is a causal argument for dualism, which takes the principle of mental causation as a premise and ends up with a dualist conclusion. The success of such an argument would give a strong incentive to pursue an non-epiphenomenalist project. Saad’s second argument (2020) is a novel exclusion problem which, unlike the original causal exclusion problem, poses a threat to epiphenomenalism. It is suggested that epiphenomenalists willing to find a way out of the problem would have to reject the principle of causal exclusion. However, the ability to uphold this principle is considered to be their major advantage over causal dualists.
I wish to show that both of these arguments are invalid. First I will show that the causal argument for dualism gives equal support to dualism and to a certain brand of strong physicalism, which significantly decreases the argument’s attractiveness from a dualist’s point of view. As for the exclusion problem for epiphenomenalism, I will argue that one of its constituent theses is a result of an unwarranted interpretation of physical theories and should be weakened to a thesis which is harmless for epiphenomenalists.
The conclusion is that epiphenomenalism remains a feasible option for dualists. Moreover, in the internal debate the onus remains on the causal dualist to prove that they hold the more viable dualist position.

Chair: tba

Time: September 6th, 17:30-18:00

Location: SR 1.003