Bo Flemming Loxtermann
Universität Siegen
There is a deficit of metaontological reflection within the analytic metaphysics of time. In my talk, I present what metaontological reflection for the metaphysics of time means, why its lack is problematic and, finally, which new theoretical options arise by such metaontological approach.
I begin by distinguishing between restricted quantification, i.e., statements about temporal localization, and unrestricted quantification, i.e., statements about temporal existence simpliciter. In line with Chalmers (2009), I argue that existence simpliciter means to exist in a qualitatively different way than just being located. Consequently, it follows that restricted quantification cannot ground unrestricted quantification.
This distinction is useful since it allows for the refutation of some eternalist positions. An example is Savitt’s view: Savitt argues that existence simpliciter is nothing but the disjunction of all restricted statements about location and is therefore grounded by them (Savitt 2006). From the metaontological perspective, which I propose, a disjunction of restricted statements cannot ground an unrestricted one; a disjunction, as being a truth-functional connective, cannot establish unrestricted statements.
I conclude the talk by considering two different reformulations of Eternalism. While restricted existence cannot ground existence simpliciter, it can be argued that existence simpliciter grounds localisation at some time or another. This correspondents to an interpretation of Eternalism in the sense of Correia/Rosenkranz (2018) and leads to an ontological dispute between Eternalism and Presentism. The second, probably new, reformulation rejects the notion of ‘existence simpliciter’ as flawed, taking an ontologically anti-realist position and allowing only for talk of temporal localisation. The result is that Eternalism and Presentism are in a metaontological dispute, i.e., they are disagreeing on the meaning and meaningful use of ‘existence simpliciter’.
Bibliography
Chalmers, David (2009). Ontological anti-realism. In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Correia, Fabrice & Rosenkranz, Sven (2018). Nothing to Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Savitt, Steven (2006). Presentism and eternalism in perspective. In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime I. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Chair: Sanggu Lee
Time: September 8th, 10:00-10:30
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 