Emanuele Tullio & Tommaso Soriani
CEU Vienna, University of Reading
Perdurantism –i.e. short-lived entities (temporal parts) ground the persistence of lifelong entities (worms) – is faced by the Epistemic Objection (EO) which challenges our belief of being lifelong entities as opposed to short-lived ones [8] [9] [14]. Despite there being some strategies for the perdurantist to tackle it [8], and the lack of an unambiguous formulation, EO has gained increasing attention over the years. Our aim is to show that, even considering different candidate epistemological principles, EO fails since a univocal and prima facie successful formulation of it cannot be achieved.
Firstly, we argue that EO should be modelled on an objection standardly raised against non-presentist A-theories of time: if there are times besides the present inhabited by conscious entities, then no entity can know if they are in the present [2].
We start by considering an internalist principle, inspired by [6] and [3]: necessarily, for a belief to constitute knowledge there are no actual nor modally close entities with our same experiential evidence holding it. However, this principle, no matter how formulated, can elude the epistemic threat of being (actual or possible) brains in a vat, and so it is hardly tenable.
Then, we examine an externalist principle, Safety [13] [10]. According to Safety, a belief constitutes knowledge iff there are no close (modally or not) believers mistakenly holding it. However, a Safety-based argument against Perdurantism also does not work. While both worms and parts hold the same belief of being lifelong entities, one can still deny their closeness in the sense implied by Safety.
Assuming that it is metaphysically necessary that we are worms and not temporal parts, one can argue that there is no possible world (close or not) where we are parts with the wrong belief of being lifelong entities. Furthermore, even if perdurantism held contingently [7], arguing that worms and parts are not close would still be possible. While temporal parts instantiate their properties simpliciter, worms inherit them as time-indexed [5]. This should suffice to argue against their closeness, thereby ensuring the safety of the beliefs at stake, pace contigentism.
Finally, we conclude with some remarks on how EO relates to the Personite Problem for Perdurantism, see [11] [12].
References
[1] Cameron, Ross P. (2015). The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology. OUP.
[2] Deasy, D., & Tallant, J., 2020, “Hazardous Conditions Persist.” Erkenntnis, 87 (4):1635-1658
[3] Elga, A., 2000, “Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem.” Analysis, 60(2): 143-147.
[4] Hawley, K. (2001). How things persist. OUP.
[5] Hawthorne, J., 2006, Metaphysical Essays. OUP
[6] Miller, K. 2017, “Presentness, Where Art Thou? Self-Locating Belief and the Moving Spotlight.” Analysis, 77 (4):777-788.
[7] Miller, K. “Contingentism in Metaphysics.” Forthcoming in In Rikki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. Routledge
[8] Noonan, H., 2010, “The thinking animal problem and personal pronoun revisionism.” Analysis, 70(1), 93–98.
[9] Rimmell, N., 2018, “Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief.” Erkenntnis, 83 (3):577-593 (2018)
[10] Russell, J. S. (2016). “Temporary Safety Hazards.” Noûs 50 (4):152-174.
[11] Johnston, Mark (2016a). “Personites, Maximality And Ontological Trash.” Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):198-228.
[12] Johnston, Mark (2016b). “The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled?” Noûs 50 (4):617-644.
[13] Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and its Limits. OUP.
[14] Zimmerman, D., 2003, “Material people.” In M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. OUP
Chair: Elena Garadja
Time: September 6th, 18:10-18:40
Location: HS E.002
SOPhiA 2026 