Agata Machcewicz-Grad
University of Warsaw
In the discussion over the nature of folk psychological mental states one can distinguish two families of accounts: superficialism (represented i.a. by D. Dennett, E. Schwitzgebel) and realism (represented i.a. by J. Fodor, E. Mandelbaum). The former states that when we attribute e.g. beliefs, we do not posit any concrete, robust, causally effective states, but we rather provide a superficial, pragmatic interpretation of a subject. On the contrary, the latter account claims that mental states we attribute are representational, causally effective and independent of our perspective on them.
The latter account has been threatened by eliminativist arguments (formulated by P. Churchland and S. Stich) to the effect that mental states as they are construed by folk psychology are useless from the perspective of mature cognitive science and as such they should be eventually abandoned. In reaction to these arguments, a proposal has been introduced (by W. Lycan and (again) S. Stich) according to which we should think of folk psychological terms as natural kind terms and of respective mental states as natural kinds. K. Posłajko has recently criticized this latter account and argued that superficialism is the only alternative to eliminativism.
In my paper I defend the view that folk psychological terms are natural kind terms and that there are good reasons to suppose that they form natural kinds. In the course of my argument I show that, pace Posłajko, the conceptual negotiations among philosophers over the notion of belief and some closely related notions (like ‘alief’ and ‘subdoxastic state’) do not prove that the notion in question is a pragmatic construct and the belief is not a ‘human kind’. I point out several examples of arguments that take into account substantial discoveries about beliefs that are relevant for our conceptual decisions. I argue that the term ‘belief’ has natural kind metasemantics and that it has the same meaning both in folk and empirical psychology.
Chair: Fabio Tollon
Time: September 8th, 12:00-12:30
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 