On Moral Being and Environmental Ethics

Jeffrey Colgan

Tulane University

The 20th century has seen two strident criticisms of the “traditional” Anglo-American approach to ethics. First, the so-called ‘species chauvinism’ inherent in many ethical theories, which prioritize a particular human group’s summum bonum and neglect more expansive conceptions of biotic well-being, has been identified and contested (see, for example, the foundational work of Aldo Leopold and Richard Routley). Second, the conception of ethics as determining universally applicable, absolute, choice-guiding rules has been challenged on the grounds that (a) moral guidance most frequently takes the form of fables and patterns not rules, (b) one cannot easily distinguish between my morality and morality as such, (c) claiming that there are specific and distinct moral scenarios is a costly reduction of the moral realm, and (d) aiming for a systematic completeness in ethics betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the ethical. In place of this purportedly narrow view of ethics, the more expanded notion of moral being has been offered, which emphasizes the moral import of the inner life of consciousness, treats metaphysics and phenomenology as inherently moral endeavors, and acknowledges a particularism with regards to moral phenomenology (see, for example, the work of Iris Murdoch and Wittgenstein-inspired ethicists). However, the expanded concerns resulting from these criticisms—environmental ethics and moral being, respectively—are difficult to reconcile for several reasons: (1) Moral being is often construed as unavoidably human-focused; (2) moral being poses challenges to the attribution of moral praise and blame; and (3) moral being retains metaphysical commitments that conflict with those of certain positions in environmental ethics.
 
First, I present these two criticisms to “traditional” ethics and the expanded concerns that result, before discussing the ways that moral being appears antagonistic to environmental ethics. Next, I address these apparent antagonisms and attempts a reconciliation. A key aspect of this reconciliation concerns localism—understood not as a strategic means to achieve a goal identified in a particular environmental ethical theory, but as a specific ethical realm within which attributions of blame and praise are given meaning.

Chair: Ugur Yilmazel

Time: September 6th, 16:50-17:20

Location: SR 1.005


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