Jinglin Zhou
LMU Munich
Evolutionary debunking argument has risen a big problem for moral realism. On of the most influential arguments is offered by Sharon Street as Darwinian Dilemma. With scientific evidence, it seems that evolutionary forces have had a tremendous influence on our moral beliefs. With this scientific premise, this dilemma says, realists can neither deny there’s a relation between our moral facts and evolutionary forces, nor admit it. This threatens moral realism. This essay first reconstructs the dilemma into two core theses:
Metaphysical thesis: moral facts posited by realists have no explanatory power.
Epistemic thesis: we can have moral knowledge only if our moral beliefs can be explained by moral facts.
Therefore, we have no moral knowledge. (Skeptic conclusion)
Therefore, moral realism is false. (Anti-realist conclusion)
To address this challenge, this article adopts the moral functionalism, which is adapted from philosophy of mind.
Moral functionalism claims that moral properties can be holistically functionally defined by a broad network. In this view, using Lewis-Ramsey method, a moral property can be defined as specific relations with other moral properties as well as some descriptive ones. Having such a definition, moral functionalism has a virtue of functional explanation, which can give an explanation that certain thing will happen when satisfying certain descriptions. This way, functionalized moral properties can have explanatory power and further explain our moral beliefs. Then, the metaphysical thesis of evolutionary challenge can be rejected, thus resisting the whole challenge.
Moreover, this article also clarifies some key issues within the debate between evolutionary debunkers, moral naturalists, moral non-naturalists and moral functionalists. What makes moral functionalism unique within the debate is its metaphysical status. In this functionalist view, moral facts are ontologically grounded in natural properties as well as explanatorily independent of them. This unique position can make moral facts less odd than non-naturalists posit and also help moral properties avoid the gap between “is” and “ought”, which naturalists are facing. This differentiates functionalism, naturalism and non-naturalism, showing us functionalism worthy a consideration. Before the end, this essay continues to argue that this functionalist account can be compatible with evolutionary account proposed by debunkers. This will make this position more robust and less rejectable.
Chair: Ugur Yilmazel
Time: September 6th, 18:10-18:40
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 