Drishtti Rawat
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
The normative non-naturalist realist holds that normative truths must exist because they are indispensable to deliberation (for David Enoch, 2011) or because they improve the coherence of theories in the normative domain (for Thomas Scanlon, 2014). In this paper, I first argue that these reasons do not justify the realist’s ontological commitment. Crucially, my argument does not consist of questioning whether their pragmatic reasons have the ability to justify belief. Instead, I reveal other ways in which the realist’s reasons are of the wrong kind by explicating the issues they cause within the realist paradigm. In the remainder of my paper, I argue for the positive thesis that there is a reason that does justify the realist’s ontological commitment better than deliberative indispensability or coherence-improving. This reason is the fact that we engage in normative deliberation. Since this reason is evidenced by observation, it is a right kind of reason for the belief that normative truths are deliberatively indispensable or coherence-improving. Consequently, it is a right reason for the belief that normative truths exist. As a right reason, the fact that we engage in normative deliberation can then justify the realist’s ontological commitment towards normative truths. However, this may come at the cost of accepting a (co-)constructivism about normative truths. The realist must then either provide alternative right reasons to justify their ontological commitment or forgo concern with justification altogether. After all, it may indeed be that normative truths exist– the realist may just not be justified in believing they do.
Chair: Ugur Yilmazel
Time: September 6th, 14:40-15:10
Location: SR 1.005
SOPhiA 2026 