Gabriel Levc
University of Vienna
Recently, some philosophers have used the notion of a perspective, understood as an “open-ended disposition to characterize: to encounter, interpret, and respond to some parts of the world in certain ways” (2019), in their theories. For example, Camp (2006, 2018) uses perspectives to account for the meaning of metaphors and the derogatory aspects of slurs, respectively. Tiberius (2008) holds that perspectives shape what we value and takes being able to switch between them to be a virtue. And Sliwa (forthcoming) argues that good moral advice involves, inter alia, sharing a perspective with the recipient of the advice.
What these conceptions of perspectives have in common is that they assume them to be sharable and thus communicable. At the same time, not much attention has been given to how they might be transmitted through language. My goal in this talk is to provide an explanation of how perspectives can be shared. To this end, I first discuss the accounts of Sliwa (forthcoming) and Whiteley (2022) who hold that perspectives are communicated via presupposition and linguistic salience, respectively. I argue against the former that perspectives do not show the projection behaviour typically associated with presuppositions, and the latter that representing a perspective’s salience structure linguistically is not necessary for getting it across.
I then propose an alternative explanation. I argue that the goals of a conversation, recently often represented as Questions under Discussion (QuDs), are something the speaker can have various perspectives themselves on. Depending on their perspective, they might have different attitudes towards what constitutes a good answer to the QuD, which answers they take to be relevant, etc. If their interlocutors give an answer that from the speaker’s perspective is unreasonable, they are forced to look for a perspective from which it makes sense. Thereby, speakers possibly change their own perspective. I close by considering how this explanation might be utilized by linguistic devices conventionally associated with changing perspectives.
Literature
Camp, E. (2006): „Metaphor and That Certain ‚Je Ne Sais Quoi‘“, Philosophical Studies 129/1, 1-25.
Camp, E. (2018): „A Dual Act Analysis of Slurs“, in Sosa (ed.): Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Oxford: OUP.
Camp, E. (2019): „Perspectives and Frames in Pursuit of Ultimate Understanding“ in Grimm (ed.): Varieties of Understanding: New Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology. Oxford: OUP.
Sliwa, P. (forthcoming): „Changing Minds and Hearts“
Tiberius, V. (2008): The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits. Oxford: OUP.
Whiteley, E. (2022): „Harmful Salience Perspectives“ in Archer (ed.): Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York: Routledge.
Chair: Szymon Sapalski
Time: September 6th, 16:50-17:20
Location: 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 