From certainty to conceptual relativism?

Kevin Braun

FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg

In Hinge Epistemology, philosophers investigate our most basic beliefs about the world, such as the belief that there is an external world, or that physical objects don’t disappear when nobody pays attention to them. On the one hand, we hold beliefs like these with fundamental and unalterable certainty. On the other hand, they seem to lack solid epistemic justification. Some authors claim this inevitably leads to (conceptual and naturalistic) relativism: The world can never be described purely, but only through the distorting lenses of conceptualization. Differences in beings’ natures can constitute different conceptual frameworks, which in turn might yield incompatible yet equally true judgements about the world – relative to the employed framework, which is ultimately relative to one’s nature. Since the world itself doesn’t legislate how it should be described, we cannot determine the superiority of one epistemic system over another. Therefore, our judgements about the world are to be taken with a grain of salt of relativism.

I will argue against this conclusion. While relativists deem it impossible to determine empirically which conceptual framework is accurate, I argue that it is conceptually impossible. A conceptual framework is not a distortion of reality, but rather the entrance to it. I aim to show that incompatible but equally true judgements are not feasible. I do this by (i) pointing out that the concepts we employ here – judgement, world, truth etc. – can only be used in specific language-games. The way the relativist uses them contradicts their logical structure. Furthermore, (ii) I try to show that parts of said structure are inherently connected to and shaped by fundamental hinge-propositions. Wittgenstein is often claimed to endorse a relativistic position in On Certainty (1969). I don’t think this is accurate. Rather, some of his remarks implicitly deny it. I will use them to demonstrate my points.

Chair: Morgan Adou

Time: September 8th, 10:40-11:10

Location: SR 1.004


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