Xian He
Zhejiang University
What makes it fitting or appropriate to love someone? According to the Quality Account of love, only loveable qualities of the beloved person can make love for that person fitting (Abramson & Leite, 2011; Clausen, 2019; Howard, 2019; Naar, 2017, 2021b; Protasi, 2016). For instance, it may be fitting to love someone because she is beautiful, kind, and thoughtful. On the other hand, serious flaws such as cruelty, dishonesty, or selfishness, could make a person unfitting to love. Although this account has recently gained a certain popularity, it is far from uncontroversial. The account has been criticized for leading to implausible conclusions. For instance, if this account is correct, it would seem fitting to replace one’s lover with someone who possesses more lovable qualities, or stop loving someone who lost these qualities. Moreover, it is unclear how the Quality Account can differentiate between the fitting conditions of love and other similar attitudes, such as liking, adoring, or longing, which seem also be fitting in virtue of the same qualities. In this paper, I am going to propose a new response to these objections. I will argue that these challenges can be met by appealing to a distinctive lovable quality of the objects of love: their metaphysical irreplaceability. Metaphysical Irreplaceability, along with other lovable qualities, constitutes how lovable a person is.
Chair: Andreas Frenzel
Time: September 8th, 12:00-12:30
Location: SR 1.006
SOPhiA 2026 