Evolving Agencies and Morally Responsibility for Past Actions

M. Hadi Fazeli

Gothenburg University

Lars cheated on Ella, leading to their separation. Years later, Ella still blames Lars for his past infidelity. However, as a matter of fact, Lars has undergone significant character changes and no longer sees himself capable of cheating. This raises the question of whether Ella can still appropriately blame him. Some philosophers argue that if Lars’s character changes sufficiently over time, he is no longer an appropriate target of blame. In this talk, I argue that such accounts fail to explain two scenarios: when Ella can still blame Lars despite his character changes and when she cannot blame him even though he retains his objectionable character. I claim that the appropriateness of Ella’s blame should not solely depend on Lars’s character at the time of blame. Blaming a perpetrator for their past action should refer a broader scope of their agency, including the time between the action and the blame. I end the talk by concluding that the appropriateness of blaming Lars for his past cheating depends on various factors, including how he views and judges his past fault over time, feelings of guilt, regret, or remorse, desires for self-improvement, verbal expressions such as confessions or apologies, and actions of compensation and amends. Lars’s beliefs, feelings, desires, speeches, and actions collectively contribute to a narrative that defines his capacity for reflection on his past. Whether blaming Lars for his past cheating is appropriate or not hinges on whether he has constructed a narrative that absolves him of blame. This argument provides a foundation for understanding moral responsibility for past actions, considering the diverse facets of our evolving agencies. It also enables a more nuanced assessment of responsibility as we navigate the complexities of our lives over time.

Chair: Maciej Jarzębski

Time: September 8th, 14:40-15:10

Location: SR 1.005


Posted

in

by