Ataollah Hashemi
Saint Louis University
The metaphysical discourse on the science of properties features a well-known dichotomy between categorical and dispositional properties. Dispositional properties are considered to be relational, extrinsic, and dynamic, representing potentialities that exist in the natural world. In contrast, categorical properties are intrinsic and qualitative. Traditionally, the distinction between these two types of properties has been justified on the grounds that dispositional properties, being relational and extrinsic, need to be grounded in categorical properties, which are non-relational and intrinsic.
While many terms in science and philosophy are described as either dispositional or categorical, the central question from a metaphysical perspective is whether this distinction reflects a fundamental difference in the nature of properties in the world or is purely conceptual or linguistic. A variety of theories have been proposed to address this question, broadly categorized as either property dualism, which posits the existence of both categorical and dispositional properties, or property monism, which argues for the existence of only one type of property.
Within the monist camp, there is a division between dispositional monists, who maintain that all properties, including categorical properties, are dispositional, and categorical monists, who claim that no property can be dispositional. Dispositional monists challenge categorical monists to provide a clear example of a purely qualitative property, while categorical monists argue that dispositional monism leads to an untenable form of structuralism in which all entities in the world are wholly relational and dynamic without any intrinsic base.
To avoid these issues, some philosophers advocate for a third view, known as the qualitative power view (QPV), according to which properties possess both dispositional and categorical qualities, and there is no ontological distinction between them. Proponents of QPV hold that a property’s dispositionality is identical to its qualitativity, and both are identical to the property itself. However, QPV needs to explain how a property can be both dispositional and categorical.
To address this challenge, proponents of QPV either adopt an anti-realist strategy or defend realism. Anti-realists argue that the dispositional/categorical dichotomy is a distinction in conception rather than in reality, while realists maintain that the distinction is real and that a property is ontologically both dispositional and categorical. The problem for anti-realists is that if the distinction is not ontological, then what is the true nature of a property that is conceived as both dispositional and categorical? Realists can provide a truth-maker for sentences that contain both dispositional and categorical terms, but this view appears to violate the monistic thesis.
In this paper, I propose a third monistic strategy based on the concept of “aspect” introduced by Donald L.M. Baxter (2016-2018). I argue that the categorical/dispositional dichotomy is real, but it does not require adding distinct entities to one’s ontology. Instead, dispositional and categorical properties are different aspects of the same entity, and these aspects are neither distinct entities nor proper parts of an entity. Aspects are qualitatively different, incomplete abstract particulars that are numerically identical to the complete individual that bears them. They function as particular ways that a complete individual is determined by that individual’s nature, and are expressed through a nominal qualifier such as “insofar as.”
I contend that this aspectival interpretation of the dichotomy avoids the difficulties of both the realist and anti-realist strategies while retaining their advantages. Aspects provide a new way of understanding the reality of the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties while maintaining a monistic ontology.
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SOPhiA 2026 