Countenancing the A Priori with the Circularity of Naturalised Metaphysics

Sami Tayub

Bristol University

In my view, naturalised metaphysics (NM) bears no better epistemic prospects than a priori metaphysics (AM). NM seeks to identify those metaphysics which are appropriately related to science, and privilege them as our only contenders which tell us how reality actually is. In contrast, AM does not bear this relation so they argue it cannot tell us about the nature of reality; as such NMians repudiate AM, or at least repurpose it as a pragmatic tool for NMians. However, I argue contemporary accounts of NM have a prior commitment to, or assume, scientific realism, which means they are viciously circular and beg the question against the empiricist. Given that scientific realism is itself a metaphysical thesis, assuming scientific realism to motivate some form of naturalism seems to stoke a vicious cycle wherein scientific realism is established on naturalistic grounds which in turn relies on the truth of some form of scientific realism. The NMian may rebut that they can provide independent reasons for countenancing scientific realism. However, it seems one’s metametaphysical inclination does indeed shape one’s scientific realist position. I show that even Ladyman and Ross (2007), who originally proposed contemporary NM and used structural realism to establish this metametaphysic, countenance structural realism and reject constructive empiricism because of their prior commitment to NM. This circularity can be relieved if the naturalist adopts a neutral claim in scientific realist debate, which I claim is that science is empirically adequate. This is enough for NM to be epistemically propitious, because the realist can infer the truth of science from this even if the empiricist abstains. However, I claim AM can be empirically adequate too. Therefore, both AM and NM can be empirically adequate, so they have similar epistemic prospects.


Reference
Ladyman, J. & Ross, D. (2007). Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Chair: Cristina Somcutean

Time: September 6th, 18:10-18:40

Location: SR 1.007


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