Josef Kohlmaier
University of Wollongong, Australia
In the discussion about neural representation the two main positions have traditionally been either ‘industrial-strength’ realism (e.g. Fodor 1988, 1994; Marr 2010; Thomson and Piccinini 2018) or eliminativism (e.g. Chomsky 2005; Churchland 1988; Brooks 1991). Many take this dichotomy of perspectives to be problematic. The former is fact assertive and requires the complete naturalisation, i.e., strictly observer-independent reductive explanation, of neural representation.
The latter implies a complete overhaul of cognitive science, as we know it. In between these two main frameworks, a third option has emerged. This takes the form of a species of anti-realism, exemplified by deflationist (Egan 2014, 2019), ascriptionist (Dennett 1991), and fictionalist (see Sprevak 2013 for an overview) views on representational explanation in the cognitive sciences.
I shall argue that it is a fallacy to infer the truth of anti-realism about neural representation by a denial of both industrial-strength realism and eliminativism. Instead, I identify and develop a fourth option. This is the so-called pragmatist approach to neural representation as exemplified by Cao (2022). Although Cao does not explicitly staple her framework as realist, and some might initially take the pragmatist stance as challenging realism, I shall highlight why it is entirely consistent with a specific form of realism. I shall show that this pragmatic view represents a contextualised form of realism that is less committal of the full naturalisation package of the industrial-strength version of realism about neural representation. The pragmatic approach to neural representation emphasises the context-dependency and specific epistemic goals of attributing representational properties to neural states and processes.
This reconceptualization has significant implications for the long-lasting debate regarding neural representation and the broader philosophical understanding of the relationship between scientific models and the natural world. By engaging with the larger context of the realism versus anti-realism debate, I contribute a novel perspective that constructively shifts the focus from metaphysically heavy forms of realism (industrial-strength realism) towards a less metaphysically heavy species of realism (contextual realism).
Chair: Johannes Nyström
Time: September 8th, 14:00-14:30
Location: SR 1.007
SOPhiA 2026 