Marlon Rivas Tinoco
University of Oklahoma
The question of whether the rationality of our beliefs can depend on practical considerations has two traditional responses. Evidentialists such as Feldman and Conee (1984), and Kelly (2002) argue that a belief is rational if and only if it aligns with the evidence, meaning that we should not believe for practical considerations. On the other hand, pragmatists such as James (1979) and Rinard (2015) argue that beliefs can also be rational if they serve the agent’s benefits. Thus, there may be occasions when it is permissible to believe something even though we do not have evidential reasons for doing so.
Susanna Rinard (2017, 2019, 2022) offers a more refined pragmatist view. Where the standard pragmatist holds that the rationality of a belief may be determined by its usefulness in achieving the agent’s practical goals, Rinard holds that the rationality of a belief is only determined by it. However, David Christensen (2020) disputes Rinard’s claim on rationality, arguing that a belief’s rationality cannot be solely based on practical considerations. He provides counterexamples of seemingly irrational beliefs that still maximize utility.
In this paper, I challenge Christensen’s objections to Rinard’s theory. First, I introduce Rinard’s theory of belief rationality, emphasizing that it does not only have a pragmatist component, but also an internalist one. I will show that Rinard’s commitment to internalism can be distinguished by suggesting the presence of an evaluative outlook that enables the agent to assess the rationality of new beliefs. Second, I introduce Christensen’s cases that allegedly debunk Rinard’s thesis. Third, I refine Rinard’s theory of rationality by arguing that the rationality of an agent’s belief can be based on what is best for them given their existing beliefs, emotions, or perceptual experiences. I will contend that some of the agent’s perceptual experiences and emotional episodes must be included in their evaluative outlook for assessing the rationality of a new belief. Last, I will redescribe the cases Christensen presents as cases that shed light on how people ordinarily deliberate in everyday life when undergoing tensions between their mental states. I will contend that the refined version of Rinard’s theory that I propose can offer a clearer picture of why Christensen fails in his attempt to reject Rinard’s original theory.
Chair: Sebastián Sánchez Martínez
Time: September 6th, 18:50-19:20
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 