Against the endurant continuants

Alfonso Romero Zúñiga

University of Tübingen

Processes play a ubiquitous role in our everyday lives, and they are also central to scientific explanations. As a result, there has been a renewed interest in the philosophy of processes and their interaction with the sciences. One prevailing and widely accepted account in contemporary metaphysics is that processes are ongoing happenings, potentially distinct from other types of occurrences such as events [Stout (1997), Fine(2002), Galton (2006)]. Processes are expressed through continuous aspect sentences (e.g., “Ana is painting a portrait”), while events are conveyed using perfect aspect sentences (e.g., “Ana has painted the portrait”).  Moreover, a fundamental assumption associated with these ideas is that processes should be understood as occurrent continuants [Stout (2003, 2016), Steward (2013, 2015)] – entities whose properties manifest themselves at a particular time and can still be individuated: Ana’s former action was a painting of the portrait as it was ongoing, even if she did not accomplish it at all: It was a “painting of portrait”, but not a “having painted the portrait”.
In this presentation, I aim to demonstrate that the aforementioned views of processes are rooted in conceptual confusion and are fundamentally misleading.

Firstly, I will argue that the notion of an occurrent continuant, also known as an endurant continuant, arises from a misapplication of the conceptual framework of persistence concerning material objects. I will show that this usage is, at best, a flawed metaphor that should be avoided in order to achieve conceptual clarity.
Secondly, I will develop two arguments against the notion that occurrents are always present while they are ongoing, i.e., in opposition to their enduring aspect. The first argument will be based on a semantical analysis of process sentences, aiming to demonstrate that the apparent necessity to posit such entities stems from a linguistic misunderstanding regarding process and event sentences. The second argument will demonstrate that irrespective of these problematic semantics, the concept of process generally accepted in the debate is incompatible with the notion of being an enduring entity. Furthermore, I will illustrate how relinquishing this feature resolves the semantical and metaphysical difficulties without requiring acceptance of the enduring aspect.

Finally, I will outline an alternative metaphysical framework for happenings based on events. This alternative approach not only helps circumvent the aforementioned problems, but also offers solutions to the same issues while remaining compatible with the central concerns of contemporary process philosophy.

In conclusion, this talk serves as a clarifying contribution to the ongoing debate on the metaphysics of processes. By offering persuasive arguments that challenge prevailing perspectives, it encourages a critical examination of existing views and creates room for the formulation of more rigorous and coherent positions. This endeavour fosters a clearer and more nuanced understanding of processes and opens up avenues for further exploration within the field.

Chair: Elena Garadja

Time: September 6th, 18:50-19:20

Location: HS E.002


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