Christina Fritz
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz
Most of the actions we perform in our daily lives we perform automatically (Lumer, 2017). That is, we perform these actions without paying attention to them. In automatic actions, we are unaware of any decision-making process or deliberation preceding the action. This raises the question of whether automatic actions are governed by decisions and reasons in the same way as fully consciously performed actions.
There are two options to approach this matter: First, automatic actions are not based on decisions. This implies that we are agents that perform most actions without having decided to do so, which seems to be inconsistent with how we typically understand free agency. Second, automatic actions are based on decisions, but these decisions are subconscious, often involving subconscious reasoning.
I will argue for the second option, which introduces a differentiation of the will that precedes any action: There is the occurrent decision at the moment one consciously chooses to act: choosing to sit down and get work done and the like. This contrasts with the many latent wantings that follow unconsciously but as a consequence of our previous occurrent decisions. My thesis is that automatic actions are based on subconscious decision-making processes which can be illustrated by giving examples of latent wantings we don’t have to be aware of in every moment, such as “wanting to stay alive”, “wanting to stay safe”, and “wanting to feel good”.
Many otherwise promising theories about free will largely neglect automatic actions. Consequently, it remains unclear whether in such theories automatic actions can be considered to be free. Here I want to focus on Carolina Sartorio’s account of actual-sequence compatibilism. Sartorio argues that freedom of action and choice is grounded in to-be-specified causal histories that require a certain amount of awareness and reasons-sensitivity. For Sartorio the freedom of an act coheres with moral responsibility as well as moral responsibility coheres with awareness of the action (Sartorio, 2016). Since automatic actions lack awareness, we must investigate if automatic actions lack freedom and moral responsibility too. I aim to offer actual-sequence compatibilism a small but important piece of the puzzle to save freedom and moral responsibility even in actions we pay no attention to most of the time.
Chair: Sharon Casu
Time: September 6th, 14:00-14:30
Location: SR 1.003
SOPhiA 2026 