Larissa Kolias
University of Calgary
Should practical stakes affect what we know? According to two prevalent theories of knowledge — contextualism, specifically that of DeRose (1992, 1995, 2009), and pragmatic encroachment (Stanley, 2005; Fantl and McGrath, 2009; Weatherson, 2012) — practical stakes do affect what we can know. Contextualism is the thesis that what is expressed by a knowledge attribution — the truth of the semantical claim that “Subject S knows that p” — depends partly on the context of the attributor. Under DeRose’s theory, if the practical stakes of the attributor’s context rise, then S must be in a better epistemic position in order for an attributor to claim that “S knows that p.” Similarly, pragmatic encroachment argues that whether you know something depends on the practical features of your situation. However, unlike contextualism, pragmatic encroachment is not concerned with attribution claims such as “S knows that p” — rather, pragmatic encroachment is agent-focused.
This presentation analyzes how practical, “non-epistemic” factors influence a subject’s relation to knowledge within systems of oppression and privilege — a relation that has been neglected within this literature. Specifically, I argue that the inclusion of practical stakes in theories of knowledge, with a focus on contextualism and pragmatic encroachment, may unwittingly perpetuate systemic oppression. As I will show, practical stakes unfairly favour the privileged and disfavor the oppressed. This is because, I argue, the privileged have epistemic vices that work against the marginalized.
According to Jose Medina (2003), two salient epistemic vices of the privileged are epistemic-laziness and closed-mindedness. Epistemic laziness is when privileged groups do not need to know, because there nothing is at stake for them by them not knowing. That is, they have very little to lose, i.e., less at stake, if they remain ignorant about how oppression functions, and this impacts the inclusion of practical stakes in such a way as to leave the underprivileged with an epistemic burden that cannot, as these theories currently stand, be reconciled. The other epistemic vice, closed-mindedness, is defined as the privileged “needing to not know.” Closed- mindedness is a result of the privileged needing to remain ignorant in order to uphold the structure which favours them and enables them to have social power, because there is much at stake for them if this structure is dismantled. That is, the privileged have much more to lose, i.e., they have more at stake, in the dismantling of systems of oppression.
As I will demonstrate, the inclusion of practical stakes in theories of knowledge interacts with these vices and the underlining causes of them, so that these stake-based theories of knowledge reinforce structural oppression and privilege. I conclude by looking at possible ways to mediate the undue epistemic burden that the inclusion of practical stakes in theories of knowledge place onto the oppressed. My two proposed solutions are: (1) to alter the way stakes function in theories of knowledge or, (2) by including feminist standpoint theory within practical stakes, so that stake-based theories of knowledge do not disproportionally favour the privileged.
Chair: Sebastián Sánchez Martínez
Time: September 6th, 17:30-18:00
Location: SR 1.004
SOPhiA 2026 