Paul Russell
Lund University
This paper is concerned with three influential contemporary statements of scepticism about moral responsibility. The first of these is Galen Strawson’s “Basic Argument” in defence of “the impossibility of moral responsibility. The second is Derk Pereboom’s account of “Hard Incompatibilism”, which holds that “we lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility”. The third view is Bernard Williams’ critique of “morality” and its (peculiar) conception of moral responsibility and blame. On the most plausible reading, both Strawson’s “Basic Argument” and Pereboom’s “Hard Incompatibilism” arrive at the same categorical and unqualified sceptical conclusion: no one is morally responsible for their actions or conduct. In certain important respects this strong sceptical conclusion finds points of agreement with Williams’ critique of the morality system and his particular criticisms of its conception of moral responsibility. In light of this, it may be assumed that the sceptical arguments that Strawson and Pereboom advance also reject the assumptions and aspirations of “the morality system”.
Contrary to this understanding, this paper argues Williams does not accept the strong sceptical conclusion. On the contrary, according to Williams’ critique, the strong sceptical conclusion is itself a product of the morality system and its problematic assumptions and aspirations. What both Strawson and Pereboom share, in particular, is a commitment to the morality system’s way of understanding the free will problem as based on its (peculiar and problematic) understanding of the concept of moral responsibility. From this perspective, the strong sceptical views that Strawson and Pereboom defend should not be interpreted as efforts to discard “morality” but, rather, express the last gasps of “morality” as it collapses under the weight of its own assumptions and aspirations.
Time: September 6th, 10:00 – 11:30
Location: E.002
SOPhiA 2026 